Is FDI Taking the Orient Express? by Vieira, Carlos et al.
  
UNIVERSIDADE DE ÉVORA 
 
DEPARTAMENTO DE ECONOMIA 
 
 
 
 
DOCUMENTO DE TRABALHO N.º 2005/16 
September 
 
 
 
 
Is FDI Taking the Orient Express?* 
 
(this version: October 2004) 
 
 
Carlos Vieira 
Universidade de Évora, Departamento de Economia 
 
Isabel Vieira 
Universidade de Évora, Departamento de Economia 
 
Aurora Galego 
Universidade de Évora, Departamento de Economia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
∗
 This research is part of the project Ezoneplus (www.ezoneplus.org), financially supported by 
the European Commission’s 5th Framework Programme. Corresponding author: 
impvv@uevora.pt 
 
 
UNIVERSIDADE DE ÉVORA 
DEPARTAMENTO DE ECONOMIA 
Largo dos Colegiais, 2 – 7000-803 Évora – Portugal 
Tel.: +351 266 740 894  Fax: +351 266 742 494 
www.decon.uevora.pt    wp.economia@uevora.pt 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
Is foreign direct investment crossing Europe towards the East? During the last few years, news of 
foreign direct disinvestments have regularly emerged on the Portuguese media. The group of 
suspects have been identified as the new European Union members, where low wages, low 
corporate taxes and a highly educated labour force seems to attract multinationals eager to cut 
costs in an economy slowly recovering from recession. The clues of investment displacements 
abound, but no definite proof has yet been found in the empirical literature. This paper considers 
the available evidence, contributing to avoid possibly unfair incriminations. 
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 2 
Introduction 
The fifth enlargement of the European Union (EU) has been often heralded as a 
positive-sum game. Although the new EU members are expected to reap the largest 
benefits, the older members would also gain from an enlarged common market. Well, 
not all really. Many studies have highlighted Portugal as the expected looser from 
enlargement. Baldwin, Francois and Portes (1997) find Portugal to be the only 
incumbent country loosing, in net terms, from enlargement. They justify this loss with 
the importance of textiles in the Portuguese economy, the sector expected to be the 
most negatively affected. Breuss (2002) estimates that the Central and Eastern 
European Countries (CEEC) will gain, on average, ten times more than the older EU 
members, which would, with enlargement, increase real GDP by an average of around 
0.5 per cent. However, he also estimates that the economic costs will surpass the 
benefits in three countries: Spain, Denmark and, especially, Portugal. 
One of the main problems of the EU’s enlargement process for the Portuguese 
economy is the possible diversion of foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, especially in 
labour-intensive industries such as textiles, a traditionally strong Portuguese sector 
within the EU. Examples of diversion can, however, also be found in technologically 
more advanced sectors, such as in electronics and electrical machinery.  
In fact, several distinct examples of FDI displacement from Portugal to the East have 
come to public, in sectors such as textiles, footwear, electric and electronic machinery. 
Some other investment projects have been reallocated to non-EU transition economies 
such as Romania, older EU member countries such as France, or even to countries 
outside Europe, like India and China. Unfortunately, to our knowledge, there is no 
consistent and detailed record of foreign disinvestments publicly available. 
The countries of Central and Eastern Europe have soon realised the importance of 
attracting large flows of foreign investment to modernise their production structures, in 
the transition from centrally planned to market economies. Foreign investments are a 
vital source of financing for industry restructuring, increasing the country’s 
technological level of production and hence promoting higher economic growth. Being 
less volatile than portfolio investment, there is a much lower risk of investment 
reversals, with the dramatic consequences recently felt for example in South-East Asia 
and Latin America. 
Sometimes considered an undesirable interference in the domestic markets, almost all 
governments worldwide now eagerly welcome foreign investments. Foreign investment 
laws have been revised and some special incentives offered. In Europe, the Irish 
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experience of an FDI-based development model, resulting in sustained strong growth 
during the last decade, stands as a much-quoted example. In Portugal, FDI inflows 
increased rapidly after accession to the, then named, European Economic 
Communities, partly sustaining economic convergence closer to EU levels. In 2002, the 
Portuguese government acknowledged the vital importance of foreign investment, 
creating the Portuguese Agency for Investment, presided by a former Finance Minister, 
with the aim of promoting abroad the advantages of investing in the country. More 
recently, the prospect of EU enlargement to the East, although welcomed in most 
political and economic circles, raised some concerns of possible disinvestments, 
especially by companies looking for lower production costs and/or a more central 
location in Europe. 
This paper will examine the evidence of FDI diversion from Portugal, assess its relative 
importance and the potential economic consequences. Diversion may be impelled by 
low wages, together with geographical proximity, a more skilled labour force, and 
increasing integration in EU markets. The next section surveys the evidence produced 
so far in the literature. Following this, several distinct approaches will be applied to 
empirically assess the question. Section two takes an informal look at the data 
available, trying to uncover the major trends. Section three employs an econometric 
model to find the major determinants of FDI flows in these countries, using the 
estimates to test the hypothesis of diversion. Section four considers the indicators of 
FDI potential and FDI performance, provided by UNCTAD, to examine the recent 
investment dynamics in these countries. Finally, some conclusions are presented in the 
last section of the paper. 
 
1. A review of the literature 
During the last few years, several studies have approached from different perspectives 
the question of the potential diversion of FDI inflows from the Southern cohesion 
countries to the EU’s Eastern new members. Barry and Hannan (2001) claim that, 
during the nineties, FDI has indeed been diverted from the Southern European 
countries (Portugal, Spain and Greece) to the CEEC. Their conclusion is essentially 
based on cursory evidence of the evolution of FDI inward stocks during this time span, 
when CEEC inflows rose by a factor of 23, while increasing 2.3 times in the EU and 
only 1.7 times in the group of Southern cohesion countries. This diversion phenomenon 
is explained, according to the authors, by the business decisions to reallocate activities 
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from the low wage Southern EU members to the even lower wage countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe. 
Braconier and Ekholm (2001) arrive at the same verdict of FDI diversion, also from 
observing simple trends in a firm-level dataset. They consider the particular case of 
Swedish multinational companies, and show that employment in these firms has 
decreased in Southern Europe during the 1990’s, while increasing by almost the same 
amount in the CEEC.1 The authors then proceed to a more formal, econometric 
analysis of wage competition between EU regions. Their estimated model suggests 
that affiliate employment in the CEEC is more sensitive to labour costs if firms also 
have affiliate activities elsewhere in the EU. However, some caution is obviously 
needed when generalising such conclusions, as the data sample contains only 
Swedish firms. 
In a study particularly devoted to the effects of enlargement on the Portuguese 
economy, Crespo, Fontoura and Barry (2004) also suggest the possibility that the 
CEEC will directly compete with Portugal, and other cohesion countries, for the same 
investment projects. They compare the competitiveness level of these countries in 
various aspects relevant to foreign investors, and expose several weaknesses in the 
Portuguese position vis-à-vis the CEEC, notably at the government and justice levels, 
the rigidity of labour markets and the quality of human capital. 
However, more formal analyses have not been able to uncover evidence of FDI 
diversion. Brenton, Di Mauro and Lucke (1999) employ a gravity model to examine the 
dynamics of bilateral FDI flows in a group of EU and non-EU states, introducing dummy 
variables for the Southern and the CEEC. They find no evidence that integration of new 
members in the EU, and the consequent increase of FDI inflows in those countries, has 
negatively affected FDI flows to the older members. 
Buch, Kokta and Piazolo (2003) also employ a gravity model to estimate FDI 
determinants and forecast FDI stocks in the CEEC and in Southern Europe. By 
comparing expected and actual FDI values, they conclude that no FDI diversion has 
occurred between the two regions during the analysed time interval. This same 
conclusion had already been reached by these same authors (see Buch, Kokta and 
Piazolo, 2003), using FDI flows instead of stocks. 
The same divergence of opinions occurs at the institutional level. The Portuguese 
central bank suggests that some reorientation of capital flows, namely to the Eastern 
and Central Europe, has taken place (Banco de Portugal, 2004, p. 188). On the wake 
                                                 
1 The same conclusions can be found in Ekholm and Markusen (2002). 
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of accession, the UNCTAD (2004, p. 72) has assertively assured that no significant 
diversion of FDI flows from the old to the new EU members has occurred. The global 
inflows of the ten new members have even decreased, from a share of 10.6% of the 
global inflows of the other fifteen members in 1995, to a share of only 3.5% in 2003. 
Given the obvious divergence of results in the literature, there is clearly space for 
further research on this issue, as new data becomes available and more robust results 
may be produced. 
 
2. The dynamics of FDI flows 
FDI inflows to the Portuguese economy grew considerably following the country’s 
adhesion to the European Communities in 1986. As may be seen in figure 1, relative 
inflows, which were always below 1% of GDP before the middle 80s, attained much 
higher magnitudes in the years that followed. Values reached 4% of GDP for the first 
time in 1991, probably due to the big investment of Ford-Volkswagen, and registered 
the peak value of around 6% in 2001. Since then, the weight of FDI inflows in the 
Portuguese GDP has hastily decreased, also prompted by the exhaustion of the 
privatisation process. 
From 1998 onwards Portugal became a net exporter of direct investment funds, thus 
reversing its well established reputation has a net absorber of foreign capital. This 
reversal may be a result of both an increased international dynamics on the part of 
domestic agents, but also a relatively lower attractiveness of the Portuguese economy 
for foreign investors. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
In fact, although gross inflows have steadily increased until 2000, following the 
worldwide decline afterwards, disinvestment  has grown sharply, leading to a 
considerable decrease of liquid FDI in the Portuguese economy in the last two years. 
(see figure 2). 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
 6 
In what concerns the CEEC, FDI has considerably increased, triggered by the 
transition process towards a market economy and the prospects of EU integration. 
From 1995 onwards, most of these countries have attracted rapidly increasing volumes 
of investment funds and some have even escaped the downward international decline 
trend in FDI in these last years. Due to a favourable geographical location and to a well 
established reputation as suppliers of cheap labour, these countries have often been 
accused of causing a diversion of investment projects from the poorer older EU 
members, such as Portugal.  
In terms of volume of the FDI inflows attracted, only the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland are comparable to Portugal. However, the comparison of these countries’ 
inflows with those received by Portugal, and also with the level of disinvestments 
registered in the Portuguese economy, do not display clear evidence of FDI diversion 
(Figure 3). 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
A distinct perspective is obtained by aggregating data and expressing it as a 
percentage of GDP, so that the differences in terms of countries’ economic dimensions 
are removed. Figure 4 presents FDI inflows has a percentage of GDP, in Portugal and 
in the eight CEEC that recently joined the EU. In spite of an almost symmetrical 
evolution in some years until the end of the 90s, the overall trend does not display 
significant differences, henceforth not suggesting diversion. Portuguese data briefly 
overtake those of the CEEC in the year 2000 and, from that year onwards, both series 
exhibit a sharp decrease. As Portugal, the new EU members also suffered a dramatic 
fall in 2003, primarily due to the end of the privatisation process in the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia. 
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
One important question when addressing the issue of possible FDI diversion is the 
identification of the main suppliers of funds. According to data from the Portuguese 
Central Bank and the Portuguese Ministry of Finance (Ministério das Finanças, 2003), 
from 1996 to 2001, the top three gross investors in Portugal were the United Kingdom, 
Germany and France. In terms of liquid investment, the ranking changes radically, with 
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Spain in the top position, followed by the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The 
fact that Spain is the main investor in Portugal may suggest that the qualms of possible 
FDI diversion towards Eastern locations may be unfounded, but also indicates that, in 
what concerns FDI, geographical proximity is a significant aspect to consider. In this 
respect, it is important to stress that the Netherlands and Germany are also the first 
and second main investors in the three above mentioned CEEC. However, neither the 
Dutch, nor German data display evidence of net disinvestment in Portugal. On the 
contrary, in the case of Germany net FDI inflows increased from 1999 to 2001 
(Ministério das Finanças, 2003: p.89). 
In terms of sectoral allocation, FDI funds in Portugal are firstly directed at services and 
secondly at manufacturing. In recent years, there has been an increasing trend in flows 
to the tertiary sector and a decline in those directed at manufacturing. The latter has 
also coincided with a reallocation of foreign funds, out of labour intensive industries, 
and into more technologically sophisticated ones. Such trend, which is positive from the 
host country’s perspective, would be inevitable, with or without the Eastern 
enlargement of the EU. In fact, there will always be alternative locations more attractive 
from the point of view of labour costs.  
 
3. The empirical analysis of FDI determinants  
The aim of this empirical analysis is twofold: first, to study the determinants of bilateral 
FDI flows and, having obtained these, to use them to estimate FDI potential levels for 
several countries and compare them with current values. In order to achieve these 
goals, a gravity model is estimated using data for the period 1993-2000. The data 
sample includes fourteen investing countries and a total of twenty seven hosts, 
including Western and Eastern European countries.2 
The estimation of the gravity model follows the methodology usually adopted in this 
area of research, thus allowing a suitable comparison of the obtained results with those 
of previous studies. The choice of the period of analysis was mainly constrained by the 
availability of reliable data. In spite of this, the time sample is adequate for the 
purposes of this analysis since it was only after the early nineties that an important 
increase in Western FDI inflows into the CEEC took place.  
In an attempt to improve on many of the previous analyses, robust econometric 
procedures were adopted, in order to obtain more accurate results. There are several 
options in terms of specification in the estimation of a gravity model. In this empirical 
                                                 
2 The list of countries included in the data sample is displayed in the Appendix. 
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analysis, panel data methods were employed, considering a two-way model with time 
and individual specific effects: 
(1) ijttijijtijt XY εγαβ +++= , 
where Yijt represents the logarithm of bilateral FDI flows over the population of the 
destination country, in order to take into account the differences in size among the 
countries considered in the sample, and Xijt stands for the logarithm of explanatory 
variables that are specific to both the origin and the destination countries. The 
specification also includes time dummies ( tγ ), to take into account business cycle 
effects. αij represents the unobservable fixed effect and itε  is the remainder stochastic 
disturbance term. 
Unlike most previous empirical studies, in this model αij represents bilateral common 
effects, instead of country specific effects, to take into account all unobservable 
country-pair specific effects that are time-invariant and may affect FDI flows between 
two countries (geographical, historical, political, cultural and other factors). Some 
authors have concluded that this approach to the econometric specification of gravity 
models is more general and generates better estimates than the traditional 
specifications (see for example Egger and Pfaffermayer, 2000, or Cheng and Wall, 
2001). Moreover, it is argued that the inclusion of bilateral common effects also 
provides better in-sample predictions, which is an important aspect to consider given 
the main objective of the present analysis. 
Equation (1) was estimated in different specifications, within the following set of 
explanatory variables: the GDP per capita in the origin country (i) and in the destination 
country (j), (GDPcap), the population of both the origin (i) and the destination country 
(j), (pop), the degree of openness of the destination country, proxied by the ratio of 
external trade (exports plus imports) over GDP, (open), the relative compensation 
levels of the host country in relation to the compensation levels of the origin country, 
(CL),3 the geographical distance between the two countries’ capital cities, (dist), and a 
dummy variable taking the value of one when the countries share a common border, 
(Frontier).4 It is important to mention that, contrary to most previous empirical research, 
                                                 
3 Compensation levels comprehend total hourly compensation for manufacturing workers, including wage and supplementary 
benefits (World Competitiveness Yearbook, 1993 to 2000). 
4 Although developments in technology and communications have shortened the relative distance between countries, suggesting 
that these variables are loosing importance and even raising doubts on the present validity of the gravity models, Eurostat data for 
1999 suggests that EU firms still prefer to invest in geographically close countries: the Nordic investors prefer the Baltic countries, 
the Swedish investors supply mainly Estonia and Lithuania, Austrian and German firms contribute largely to Slovenia and the 
Slovak Republic, while firms in the Netherlands and Germany (the main investors in the CEEC), and also France, are important 
investors in Poland. 
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we analyse the relationship between FDI flows and the population and GDP per capita 
of investing countries, variables usually not considered in the tests.  
Other variables which are usually employed in similar studies of FDI diversion to 
Eastern countries, such as labour force skills, country risk, measures of economic 
transformation or privatisation schedules, could not be used in this work.5 In fact, we 
are considering a panel data for a total of 27 host countries, consisting of both Western 
and Eastern nations, and therefore information about those variables is not consistently 
available for a satisfactory number of countries and years. 
In a panel data model, if the common specific effects (αij ) are correlated with the 
explanatory variables, a fixed-effects model should be adopted. On the other hand, if αij 
are treated as random variables, then we have a random effects model. In the random 
effects model, the explanatory variables are assumed to be independent of αij, itε  and 
tγ . The Hausman test was used to test this correlation. There was no rejection of the 
null hypothesis of no correlation between the common specific effects and the 
regressors. A random effects model may therefore be used, as the possibility of 
endogeneity of the explanatory variables was discarded, following from their correlation 
with the bilateral common effects in the model. 
Another possible source of endogeneity derives from the fact that the explanatory 
variables may be correlated with the idiosyncratic error term ( itε ). In general, previous 
studies do not investigate this type of correlation, and the explanatory variables are 
assumed to be exogenous. In this work we have performed a sensitivity analysis, 
considering several combinations of variables as potentially endogenous and 
employing the instrumental variables estimator.6 The results were not much different 
from the ones obtained when considering all the variables as exogenous. Moreover, 
endogeneity tests did not reject the hypothesis of exogeneity of the variables. As a 
consequence, we estimate a random-effects model and use the Generalised Least 
Squares method to obtain consistent and efficient estimates. The results for the 
different  specifications are reported in table 1. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
                                                 
5 Other explanatory variables, like the weight of the deficit on the country’s GDP and the inflation rate turned out to be not 
significant and therefore were not included in the specifications presented. 
6 We considered the possibility of GDPcapi, GDPcapj, Open and CLij to be endogenous and used lagged values of these variables 
as instruments. 
 10 
It may be concluded that, although there are discrepancies in magnitude, the 
parameters’ estimates are not qualitatively different for most of the variables of interest 
included in the several specifications of the model. The results indicate that the GDP 
per capita of the destination country has a positive influence on FDI inflows, whereas 
distance between countries seems to have a negative effect. In addition, there are 
suggestions that trade and FDI can be considered as complements, as the variable 
open seems to positively affect foreign investment inflows.7 This result is not in 
accordance with some authors who claim that trade and FDI are substitutes. On the 
contrary, it corroborates the idea that FDI is associated with the intensification of 
production segmentation leading to an expansion of international trade. 
Significant is also the fact that relative labour compensation levels exert a negative and 
significant influence on FDI. This supports the common notion that labour costs are a 
decisive factor of FDI attraction in some countries and productive sectors. On the other 
hand, the fact that both countries share a common border does not seem to affect the 
FDI flows significantly. The population of the host country is not significant, which is in 
accordance with the findings of previous studies and would obviously be expected as 
we are using FDI/POPj as the dependent variable.  
Unlike most previous empirical analyses, however, our study reveals a positive 
relationship between FDI and both the population and the GDP per capita of investing 
countries. This positive relation suggests that the larger the economic and 
demographic dimensions, the higher the probability of entrepreneurs to engage in 
foreign investments. A possible explanation is that firms in larger and more populated 
countries have better possibilities of, inside their borders, reaching the minimum 
efficient scale necessary to support the structures for international expansion. Smaller 
and relatively less populated countries, with a relatively smaller potential demand, are 
less motivating and less capable of generating the suitable environment for the 
emergence of large-scale firms, which are most probably prepared to expand their 
activities at the international level. 
These results suggest that, as the theoretical analyses indicate, both market and 
efficiency reasons influence the decisions to invest abroad. The positive relationship 
between host country’s GDP per capita and FDI flows imply that the hypothetical 
purchasing power of potential consumers is often considered by international 
entrepreneurs when deciding the international allocation of investment funds. This is 
obviously the case of those projects directed to the supply of foreign markets. Although 
                                                 
7 The degree of openness of the host country is statistically significant at the 1% level in the second model and significant at the 
6% level in the third. These results suggest that there is in fact a positive relationship between the two variables. 
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low labour costs often reflect low average productivity and/or a scarcity of skilled 
labour, a negative significant relationship between labour compensation levels and FDI 
emerges from the estimations, thus sustaining a rationale for efficiency seeking FDI. In 
fact, some projects are implemented abroad with the objective of reducing production 
costs and are therefore attracted to areas where labour is less expensive, 
independently of its inherent qualifications and/or productivity. 
The estimation results, and more specifically those of specification (3), are used to 
perform in-sample predictions of FDI flows to Portugal, Spain, Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Slovenia and Hungary. The objective is to assess FDI diversion from the EU 
periphery to the CEEC, by comparing the potential and current flows to these countries.  
In order to calculate the expected FDI flows, only data from the major European 
investors (Austria, Germany, Netherlands and France) and from the United States and 
Japan are considered. The results of the ratio of potential FDI inflows to observed ones 
are presented in Table 2.  
Due to a catching-up effect, considering that these countries still exhibit FDI stocks 
below the ones observed on average in the other EU members, it should be plausible 
to expect that potential values would be below the observed ones in the CEEC (values 
below unity in the indicator displayed in table 2). The same could be expected in the 
Iberian countries, although with lower magnitudes, given the fact that they also still hold 
values much lower than the EU’s average.   
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
It may be concluded that most countries display a similar trend on the ratio between the 
potential and the current levels of FDI. Therefore, there is not much difference on the 
results for the several countries. In most cases the displayed values are below unity 
until 1998 (slightly lower for the CEEC, but not as much as expected), and above unity 
in 1999, declining significantly in 2000 (the exception being Slovenia). This latter result 
seems to be in accordance with international data on FDI flows, which reveal that there 
was a major decline on FDI flows in the year 2000 for most countries, being the 
Eastern countries and the Iberian countries an exception to this pattern. Therefore, we 
find no evidence of FDI diversion from the Southern countries to the CEEC in these 
years. This does not mean, of course, that this phenomenon has not been happening 
beyond the year 2000, or that it will not happen in the future as new developments 
unfold. These results are in accordance with those of earlier analyses, such as those of 
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Buch et al. (2001 and 2003), but not in line with those of  Braconier and Ekholm (2001), 
who find diversion effects on employment. 
 
4. Potential versus performance indicators 
The comparison in the previous section between expected and actual FDI values may 
be complemented by contrasting two similar indicators recently presented by the 
UNCTAD (2002): the performance and the potential indices of FDI attraction. The 
performance index is computed by simply dividing the share of a country’s FDI inflows 
in the world global FDI by the share of that country’s GDP in the world’s GDP. A value 
of one would then indicate that this country attracts FDI in proportion to its economic 
dimension. Most CEEC and Cohesion countries present values above unity in the 
period 1998-2000, with a few exceptions revealing possible structural competitiveness 
problems in those economies. 
On the other hand, the potential index is intended to measure each country’s potential 
to attract FDI, and it is computed as a simple weighted average of several structural 
variables, arbitrarily chosen, including some of those employed in the model estimated 
above (real GDP growth, GDP per capita, total exports, telephone mainlines, 
commercial energy use, R&D expenditures, students in tertiary education and country 
risk). However, no econometric analysis is performed to test each variable’s 
significance as an FDI determinant. 
The relative position of each country, in terms of both indices, is plotted in Figure 5 for 
some EU members. The arrows indicate the evolution from the period 1988-90 to the 
period 1998-2000. The figure confirms that both the Southern countries and the CEEC 
share similar characteristics. All these countries increased their potential to attract FDI 
but, simultaneously, all worsened their performance between the end of the eighties 
and the end of the nineties. 
 
[Figure 5 about here] 
 
Remarkably, the situation is quite different in the Northern and Central EU members. In 
all these countries that are displayed in the figure, the potential indices have also 
increased but, at the same time, all were able to also augment their performance in 
attracting FDI projects. This raises the question of whether FDI in the South may be 
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diverted not to the EU new members, but to the Northern and Central EU older 
member states. 
 
Conclusions 
The prevailing perception that the recent process of EU enlargement may have 
displaced FDI projects from Portugal, and other Southern Cohesion members, to the 
newly arrived member states is consistently not confirmed by the quantitative analyses. 
Some possible explanations may be tentatively proposed. First, consistent and reliable 
data for these countries still cover a rather limited time span, so that econometric 
evidence of diversion may only emerge after new data arrive, also covering the post-
adhesion period. Second, the investment projects actually diverted to the East, which 
sometimes appear in the media’s front pages, represent a small fraction of global FDI 
flows, too insignificant to be detected by the empirical tests. Third, it may be that FDI is 
not being diverted from the South to the East, but to other non-CEEC locations. 
The effects of full EU membership on FDI reallocation are still not clear. First, the 
adoption of the acquis communautaire, namely in terms of labour and environmental 
policies, may imply some additional costs for firms. Conversely, it may reduce 
investment risks, ensuring more clear relationships between firms, investors and 
governments. Second, the new members will benefit from the EU structural funds, 
aimed at, among others, improving basic infrastructures and labour force skills. Third, 
most new members have recently implemented some measures aimed at promoting 
FDI, namely by liberalising some markets and reducing corporate taxes. 
Competition over corporate taxes recently generated a live debate within the EU, with 
Germany and France in the forefront trying to establish minimum rates, fearing that the 
very low taxes in the new EU members might affect foreign investments in Central 
Europe. The older members are even threatening to cut development aid to the 
newcomers, arguing that such low corporate taxes suggest they do not need the 
money. In Portugal the basic rate is 27.5%, bellow that of the EU 15 average of 31.5%, 
but above the average of the new members – 21.5%. However, the general opinion 
seems to be that corporate taxes are not the main FDI attractor. Low wages are still 
considered to be the main Eastern attraction. In Germany, for instance, although 
corporate tax rates are almost two times higher than those in the new members, labour 
costs are between five and twelve times above labour costs in Eastern countries. 
Competition for FDI will increase in the European Union, and it will certainly be 
extremely difficult for Portugal to compete with the new EU partners to attract the same 
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type of FDI projects. Being an established EU member for almost twenty years confers 
some relative advantages for the Portuguese economy. It possesses better 
infrastructures, a more reliable legal and administrative environment, stronger 
purchasing power, and higher political and macroeconomic stability, namely from being 
already an EMU member. Obviously, some of these advantages may soon be eroded 
as the catching-up process in the new members evolves. Besides, Portugal also 
presents several important disadvantages relatively to the new EU members, affecting 
its ability to attract foreign investment. Most of these are of a more structural nature, 
and are difficult to surpass in the medium term: higher production costs in terms of 
wages and corporate taxes, more rigid labour laws (see, for example, Riboud, 
Sánchez-Páramo and Silva-Jáuregui, 2002), a less educated labour force, a smaller 
market, more distant from the EU’s centre. 
The earlier role of the Southern EU countries as low wage destinations of FDI, lately 
assumed by the EU’s newcomers, is now being taken over by non-EU countries further 
East. Apparently, the Express continues heading towards the Orient. On the part of 
Portugal, there is however still time and scope for political measures aimed at 
strengthening its relative advantages as an attractive FDI destination. 
 
References 
BALDWIN, R., FRANCOIS, J. and PORTES, R. (1997) The costs and benefits of 
eastern enlargement: the impact on the EU and Central Europe, Economic Policy, 
24, 125-170. 
BANCO DE PORTUGAL (2004) Relatório do Conselho de Administração, Banco de 
Portugal. 
BARRY, F. and HANNAN, A. (2001) Will enlargement threaten Ireland’s FDI Inflows?, 
Quarterly Economic Commentary, December 2001, Economic and Social 
Research Institute, Dublin, pp. 55-67. 
BRACONIER, H. and EKHOLM K. (2001) FDI in Central and Eastern Europe: 
Employment effects in the EU, CEPR w.p. 3052. 
BRENTON, P., DI MAURO, F. and LUCKE, M. (1999) Economic integration and FDI : 
an empirical analysis of foreign investment in the EU and in Central and Eastern 
Europe, Empirica, 26, pp. 95-121. 
BREUSS, F. (2002) Benefits and Dangers of EU Enlargement, Empirica, 29, pp. 245-
274. 
 15 
BUCH, C., KOKTA, R. and PIAZOLO, D. (2001) Does the east get what would 
otherwise flow to the south? FDI diversion in Europe, Kiel Institute of World 
Economics W.P. 1061. 
BUCH, C., KOKTA, R. and PIAZOLO, D. (2003) Foreign direct investment in Europe: Is 
there redirection from the South to the East?, Journal of Comparative Economics, 
31, pp. 94-109. 
CHENG, I-Hui and H. WALL, H. (2001) Controlling for Heterogeneity in Gravity Models 
of Trade, The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Working Paper 1999-010B. 
CRESPO, N., FONTOURA, P. and BARRY, F. (2004) EU Enlargement and the 
Portuguese economy, The World Economy, 27(6), pp. 781-802. 
EGGER, P. and PFAFFERMAYR, M. (2000) The Proper Econometric Specification of 
the Gravity Equation: a Three-Way Model with Bilateral Interaction Effects, mimeo, 
revision requested by Empirical Economics. 
EKHOLM K. and MARKUSEN, J. (2002) Foreign Direct Investment and EU-CEE 
Integration, background paper for the conference “Danish and International 
Economic Policy” held at the Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen. 
Institute for Management Development, The World Competitiveness Yearbook, several 
issues. 
MINISTÉRIO DAS FINANÇAS (2003) Portugal no Espaço Europeu – o Investimento 
Directo Estrangeiro, Departamento de Prospectiva e Planeamento. 
OECD (2002) International Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook, 1980-2000. 
RIBOUD, M., SÁNCHEZ-PÁRAMO, C. and SILVA-JÁUREGUI, C. (2002) Does 
Eurosclerosis Matter? Institutional reform and labour market performance in 
Central and Eastern European Countries in the 1990’s, Social Protection 
Discussion Paper Series n. 0202, The World Bank. 
UNCTAD (2002) World Investment Report 2002: Transnational Corporations and 
Export Competitiveness, United Nations. 
UNCTAD (2004) World Investment Report 2004: The Shift Towards Services, United 
Nations. 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix: Data sources 
FDI flows - OECD data on FDI outflows from Austria, Benelux, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, 
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United States and Japan to a panel of countries that include all the present EU 
members, Japan, United States, Canada, Australia, Norway, Switzerland, Poland, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia and Bulgaria, between 1993 
and 2000 (whenever data is available) is used. 
 
GDPcapi and GDPcapj – GDP per capita from origin country and destination country  
Source:  Chelem Database 
popi and popj – population of both origin and destination countries  
Source: Chelem Database 
Distj – geographical distance in km between the countries’ capital cities 
Source: http://www.indo.com/distance/ 
Frontier – dummy variable equal one if the countries share a common border 
CLij – compensation levels of the host country in relation to the compensation levels of 
the origin country 
Source: IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook 
All variables are in constant values (1990 US dollars). 
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Figure 1 – Portuguese direct investment abroad and foreign investment in Portugal 
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Figure 2: Foreign direct investment in Portugal (10^6 euros) 
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Figure 3 – FDI inflows in Portugal and in the major CEEC recipients (billions $) 
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Figure 4 – FDI inflows in Portugal and in the EU new Eastern and Central members 
(% GDP) 
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Figure 5: Inward FDI Performance (horizontal axis) and Potential Indices, 1988-90 to 1998-
2000 (UNCTAD) 
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  Table 1: Determinants of FDI flows  
Random-Effects GLS Regressions 
   (1) (2) (3) 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
GDPcapi 
3.492* 
(0.69) 
       3.337* 
       (0.69) 
3.769* 
(0.73) 
GDPcapj 
0.951* 
(0.13) 
      1.089* 
       (0.14) 
1.698* 
(0.32) 
Popi 
0.623* 
(0.12) 
0.588* 
(0.12) 
0.736* 
(0.13) 
Popj 
-0.175 
(0.12) 
-0.022 
(0.13) 
-0.038 
(0.14) 
Openj 
 
_ 0.652* 
(0.22) 
0.448 
(0.24) 
Clij 
_ _ -0.616* 
(0.23) 
Distij 
-0.836* 
(0.17) 
-0.734* 
(0.17) 
-0.848* 
(0.17) 
Frontier 
-0.063 
(0.48) 
-0.028 
(0.47) 
-0.136 
(0.48) 
Constant 
-37.581* 
(7.10) 
-38.084* 
(7.07) 
-48.459* 
(8.07) 
N 
2177 2177 1674 
 
Wald Test (all coeff. =0) 477.46* 488.45* 324.15* 
Std. Deviation Residual 1.047 1.047 1.065 
Hausman specif. test 19.15           20.04 19.07 
All variables in logs. Dependent variable is the logarithm of FDI flows/POPj. Variables definition, 
countries used in regression and data sources are displayed in the appendix. Year dummies were also 
included but not reported.  (*) and (**) denotes values significant at 1% and 5% respectively. 
 
Table 3: Potential and Current FDI Flows 
(Potential/Current) 
  1993 1994 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Czech Rep. 0,76 0,77 1,02 1,05 0,99 0,98 0,76 
Hungary 0,43 0,82 0,66 1,09 0,76 1,79 1,20 
Poland  1,13 0,51 0,84    
Slovenia     0,54 0,84 1,22 
Portugal 0,75 0,62 0,69 0,75 0,96 1,94 0,76 
Spain 0,50 0,69 0,81 0,72 0,90 1,37 0,85 
    Source: Potential values use the estimates from specification (3) on table 1. 
 
